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Any object can be a model if it is used as a model — that is if it 
triggers accounts that could plausibly be about another object.






n his dialogue, D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot used the spi-
der’s web and the way it propagates vibrations as an anal-
ogy for the nervous system — with the spider analogous to
the brain: 
‘Imagine a spider at the centre of its web. Disturb a thread
and you will see the creature rush up on the alert. Now
suppose that those threads that the insect draws from its
own body and draws in again at will were a sensitive part
of itself.’
(Diderot 1769 p.182)
And when the character Bordeau challenged the explanation
by making the observation that ‘messages weaken in propor-
tion to the distance they come from’. Diderot responded by
providing Mademoiselle de L’Espinasse with an analogy for
the threads of a web and she says ‘if there is the very gentlest
tap on the end of a long rod I can hear it if my ear is applied to
the other end’ (Diderot 1769 p.184).
Diderot was attached to the use of analogy (Hobson 1995).
Wittgenstein too used analogy widely, for example, when
explaining how to teach about philosophy he uses the analogy
of finding his way in a town:
‘… to be a good guide, one should show people the main
streets first … and just as a good guide will show one new
streets everyday, so I will show you new words.’
(Wittgenstein 1939 p.44)
I
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Wittgenstein also saw ‘proofs in mathematics as analogous to
explanations offered in Freudian psychology’ (Göranzon &
Karlqvist 1995). Sophocles used the often employed analogy of
the state as a ship in Antigone: 
‘The image tells us that a city, like a ship, is a tool built by
human beings for the subjugation of chance and nature.
The city-ship, in the tradition of the image is something
safely water-tight, a barrier against imminent external
dangers.’
(Nussbaum 1986 p.59)
In all these cases a mere statement of the analogy is not
enough. It is the use of analogy that exposes its power and
institutes it. 
THEORIES ABOUT ANALOGIES
Diderot, again in D’Alembert’s Dream, tried to explain how
analogy is worked out by the brain. ‘Analogy, even in the
most complex cases’, he wrote ‘boils down to a rule of three
progression working itself out in the sensitive instrument’
(Diderot 1769 p.162). The rule of three that Diderot mentioned
is a way of working out a term in a ratio. For example, I can
write the ratio 
2 : 4
and say it is equivalent to the ratio 
5 : 10
or I might write the expression 
4 : 16
and say it is equivalent to 
8 : ?
The rule of three gives me an algorithm, a way of reckoning
what should be put in place of the question mark. The matter
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is not quite so clear cut as it first seems. Applying the rule of
three makes 4 : 16 equivalent to 8 : 32 but clearly the two
expressions are not the same — they involve different numer-
als — so in some ways they are not equivalent. There was also
the assumption in applying the rule of three that the notation
4 : 16 meant that what is to the right is four times what is on
the left. Another possibility is that what is to right is the square
of what is to the left then 4 : 16 would be said to be a short-
hand for 4 : 4² (or 4 : 4 × 4) and if the second expression is
equivalent then it should be 8 : 8² (or 8 : 8 × 8) which
becomes 8 : 64. In adopting one of these particular approaches
to solving the mathematical puzzle we are inclined to make
assumptions, indeed we have to make assumptions, about how
equivalence is to be assessed.
In D’Alembert’s dream, Diderot gave a number of examples of
analogies, for instance between common people and heroes: 
‘If the lance of the ordinary soldier is ten feet long, how
long is the lance of Ajax?’
(Diderot 1769 p.162)
Presumably Ajax is taller or stronger and is able to use a longer
lance. The implication is if we knew how much taller, or
stronger Ajax was we could work out the length of his lance.
The analogy suggests that there is a relationship between the
size of a lance that someone can comfortably use and their stat-
ure. Diderot also suggested that this relationship is precisely
known since it can be used to calculate the length of a lance.
As Diderot put it:
‘The strides of the gods and the leaps of their steeds will
be in the same ratio as the gods are deemed to bear to
men’
(Diderot 1769 p.162)
But before this can be done something must be said about the
equivalence of two situations. What is involved in finding the
ratio that gods are deemed to bear to men? How does Ajax
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relate to the ordinary soldier? What is being compared? What
is the ratio that Diderot mentions? Is Ajax taller, or stronger?
What if Ajax is both stronger and taller what algorithm should
we use to work out the length of a lance?
There is a difficulty here because Diderot was saying that two
ratios or situations are somehow equivalent. And when you
look into equivalence you discover there are many different
kinds — even in mathematics. There is identity where one
object turns out to be exactly the same object as something
that was originally thought to be different. There is the idea of
congruence where one object is not identical to another but it
can be used satisfactorily in place of another. There is defini-
tion where one object is used as the name of another. There is
similarity (and translation and symmetry) where some, but not
all, properties are the same in two objects. Your image in the
mirror, for example, is similar but not the same as your appear-
ance. There is procedural equivalence where it can be shown
that one object could be used in some way to generate or
make another distinctive object. For instance, where a plan is
used to construct a building, or where a computer program
plays a part in causing a computer to behave in a characteristic
fashion.
Diderot himself appears to have been aware of the difficulty of
saying what kind of equivalence an analogy is since he resorted
to analogy to talk about the equivalence he felt existed in an
analogy. He compared analogies with vibrating strings and the
sympathetic resonance that can be set up in vibrating strings.
His analogy (for analogies) demands a situation where four
strings simultaneously resonate or at least it demands a situation
that can be imagined because the situation that he chose for his
analogy, as he wrote, ‘does not occur in nature’. What Diderot
chose for an analogy gets a point across, but the source of the
analogy, he proposes, is unrealistic. Diderot’s analogue, he
admitted, was a fantasy and, while this may disturb the scien-
tist, he pointed out that it ‘matters little to the poet’. Diderot
BoM.book  Page 36  Monday, July 7, 2003  12:01 PM
John Monk
The Book of Models 37
turned this substantial blemish in his analogy into a moral to
the tale and he suggests that nature often presents the philoso-
pher ‘with a quite different phenomenon from the one he had
been counting on’, then, Diderot continued, ‘he realizes that
analogy has been playing tricks on him’, and this implies that
on occasions the equivalence at play in an analogy is not the
equivalence that was originally presumed.
Saussure applied analogy to the evolution of the sounds of
words. Saussure saw analogies in terms of proportions rather
than their close cousins, ratios. He felt that 
‘… any analogical creation may be pictured as similar to a
proportion’ 
(Saussure 1974 p.166)
and in giving his examples he used a notation which he
referred to as equations which he solves. One of his examples
where he gave the solution for x is 
õrãtõrem : õrãtor = hõnõrem : x
x = honor
(Saussure 1974 p.167)
Saussure explained that there are four components in an anal-
ogy: the analogical form, a model, a set of examples from
which the model arises and a rule. These ingredients are put
together so that an ‘analogical form is a form made on a model
of one or more forms in accordance with a definite rule’ (Saus-
sure 1974 p.161). But finding a definite rule for establishing
equivalence, as we have already seen, is not as straightforward
as this implies. And in the example 
pardonner : impardonnable = décorer : x
x = indécorable
(Saussure 1974 p.167)
it is certainly not clear what either the rule or the model are.
In the examples the model and the rule are not made explicit.
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There seems to be an assumption in Diderot’s and Saussure’s
writing that there is an unwritten calculus at work in analogy
but nowhere is the calculus spelled out. All that can be con-
cluded is that in the examples that Saussure gave, he would
have said that an analogy is at play and that he therefore
believes the words in each example are related. Wittgenstein
offered an account (Wittgenstein 1939 pp.58–67) which leads
us to see Saussure’s and Diderot’s demonstrations of analogy
simply as examples. Each example shaping our view of what
an analogy is. None of the examples provides an explanation
of what an analogy is nor a theory for creating new analogies.
There is no calculus for analogies and therefore no way of pre-
dicting what will stick as an analogy, but when you create an
analogy you add to the meaning of the word analogy (Witt-
genstein 1939 p.76). 
MODELS
In the book Real-time object-oriented modelling there is a state-
ment attributed to Douglas Ross: 
‘x is a model of X if we can learn about X by asking ques-
tions of x’
(Selic et al. 1994 p.3)
This statement resembles Saussure’s formulation and the situa-
tion where Diderot would apply the rule of three, however
the models being referred to in the book are models of engi-
neering systems. I can write the statement out using Saussure’s
notation: 
x : Answers to questions about x = X : Answers to questions 
about X
The model is explicitly the term x, but x has an essential prop-
erty and that is we should be able to ask questions about x and
get answers, and the objects x and X will be analogous if the
answers to the questions about x and X are analogous.
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Engineers’ models are often couched in mathematical nota-
tion. Here is an example of a mathematical model of part of a
power station
(T394 1989)
But to accelerate the discussion I will use an everyday example
of a mathematical model. At lunch time the other day I had a
look in a shop window, in Stockholm, at a menu. One item
on the menu was
Soup 85 SKr 
Here we have a mathematical model of soup. I could use the
model like this: I could assume that I went into the restaurant,
ordered some soup, ate it and gave the cashier 100 SKr. I
would get 100 SKr minus 85 SKr back. With a little arithme-
tic, I could calculate that my change will be 15 SKr. So I
could, with the model of the soup and a model of a situation,
work out what would happen. Notice that the model is lim-
ited, it does not tell me everything about the soup, and the
model is not soup or money. You might say the model corre-
sponds in some way to reality. And use of the model helps me
figure out what would happen in reality. 
The trouble is, in this case, I did not buy the soup, or eat it. So
what I worked out using the model was a fiction. The story I
constructed based on the model seemed to be just like the
story I would have constructed had I written an account of
going into the restaurant and having some soup. The model
guided me in constructing a story, involving the soup, that was
plausible. It is important to add that the model did not tell me
everything I needed to complete the story. It did not offer
signs or clues of a number of things that in the kinds of situa-
tions that I described we often, but sometimes mistakenly, take
for granted, for example, the model did not tell me about how
dh
dt
---- 0.04 Wf Ws–( )=
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money is used or how soup is served. Use of the model pro-
vided me with an account that could have been furnished by
an experience or an experiment involving the soup, but with
the model I did not consume anything or run any financial or
culinary risks. However using the model, instead of experi-
menting with soup, left me hungry and I still had to find
somewhere to eat. 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF MODEL
Perhaps when I use the word model in the context of engi-
neering you think not of a mathematical model but of a scale
model, perhaps a scale model of a building, ship or aircraft. A
scale model of a building is not a piece of text or mathematics
but an artefact. Nevertheless the use of the model, even look-
ing at it can help me to fabricate a story that would also be
plausible if told about the building being modelled. So I look
upon a model as an object (a text and a piece of paper with
mathematics written can be objects too) that stimulates people
to give accounts that could also be triggered by the object
being modelled.
The model is different from the object being modelled so
some accounts of the model are meaningless in the context of
the modelled object. For example, comments on the colour
scheme of the menu may make no sense in a situation where I
ate and bought soup. A model cannot trigger all possible sto-
ries about the modelled object so a model is in some way spe-
cialised and limited. Of course if all the accounts of the model
and the object being modelled were the same then the objects
would be indistinguishable and we might even conclude that
they were the same object. However, such a conclusion would
always be provisional since sometime later distinctive accounts
may emerge.
One special group of models is the set of models created by
instruments — measurements. Instruments are machines for
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creating models or rather the appearance of the instrument is
taken to be a model. For example, if I want to bath a baby I
need to be sure the water is not too hot. I can put a thermom-
eter in the bath and look at it. From the appearance of the
thermometer I will be able to give an account of the bathing
the baby. When the thermometer indicates 40°C — the bath
is too hot — my account of bathing the baby would have a
shocking effect, so shocking that it would prevent me from
actually proceeding without first cooling the water.
Maja-Lisa Perby (Perby 1995) has talked about the process
operators, people who operate large industrial installations
such as power stations and chemical plants. They are sur-
rounded by instruments. Their collection of instruments
presents a picture, or a model, of the process they are control-
ling. The plant operators’ accounts, triggered by the picture
composed of the faces of a collection of instruments, are also
taken to be their accounts of the process. The point of the
instruments is to help operators give accounts that are con-
fidently received as tales about the process that they are work-
ing with but without them having to directly experience the
high temperatures, pressures or radiation hazards in large and
dangerous plant. But without direct experience their accounts
can only be accounts of a model of the process, or, for the lis-
tener, the plant operators’ accounts are models of the accounts
that might have been told about the process.
There is no limit to the number of models that a modelled
object may have and every object is a potential model. A pic-
ture can be a model. Plans can be models. The text of a com-
puter program can be a model for a computer running a
program A computer running a program can be a model. Any
object can be a model if it is used as a model — that is if it trig-
gers accounts that could plausibly be about another object. 




The account triggered by a model is a hybrid. It includes
words that are associated with the model but it, naturally,
includes words that would be associated with the object being
modelled. Whether this kind of account makes sense or not is
impossible to predict. The criteria will be whether people find
it useful or not. Can they make new predictions, gain new
insight, save effort or avoid danger? Are they satisfied by the
results? 
The same criteria apply to analogy. People will say ‘it’s a good
analogy because it is useful’ (Wittgenstein 1939 p.67). Use of
an analogy involves transplanting words used in one situation
into a new context, or as Saussure puts it creating ‘a garment
covered with patches cut from its own cloth’ (Saussure 1974
p.171). Transplanting a single word is, perhaps more properly
called a metaphor. An analogy is more. An analogy is the
import, wholesale of words and phrases, a collection of meta-
phors and linguistic practices. Using an analogy involves trans-
planting a word and allowing other words that seem to be
attached to drift along too. Where the hydraulic term flow is
applied to electricity we also use the term current and more
recently the hydraulic terms channel and drain have also been
adopted by electrical engineers to describe parts of certain
transistors where currents flow.
A model, or an analogue is an object that we can talk about; it
is an established object that causes us to have conversations and
is associated with a particular vocabulary and linguistic prac-
tice. It becomes a model, or analogue, when we regularly use
these particular linguistic practices as though some other object
was the focus of attention. The hybrid linguistic practice is
analogy. 
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CREATION
The binding between a model, or analogue, and specific lin-
guistic practices is arbitrary, and there is no systematic relation-
ship between the domains that offer analogies and the domains
that provide a home for an analogy. But models are not
entirely arbitrary. Models arise in the context of a history of
models. The creation of new models is based on existing mod-
els and in this way successions of models form a genre. The
genre becomes a body of work that affects those that create
new models. But while many analogies and models are a part
of a tradition, some analogies will be fresh and spontaneous.
How do new analogies and genre arise? This is like the ques-
tion about the chicken and the egg, but perhaps new analogies
arise in the same way as new metaphors (Rorty 1989) because
someone wants to create a new effect or perhaps by accident
an effect is created. The analogy makes no sense but has a use-
ful effect. If other people think it is useful they adopt it and if
not it disappears from use. Like definitions, some analogies ‘are
uninteresting, some will be entirely muddling, others very use-
ful’ (Wittgenstein 1939 p.76). Gradually the successful analogy
becomes common currency just as
‘… one speaker had to coin a new word, then others had
to imitate and repeat it until it forced itself into standard
usage’
(Saussure 1974 p.168)
There is a crucial point where the analogy ceases to be an anal-
ogy; a point where we forget we are dealing with a hybrid lan-
guage. For example, now we talk about electric current and its
flow without worrying about the analogy with hydraulics
unless it is pointed out. Once we forget the analogy, the anal-
ogy becomes our reality— electric current is real. Heat really
flows, information really does flow and we do really absorb
information. In engineering, which has drawn on mathematics
for inspiration for its analogies, some engineers might say that a
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system, a ship for example, behaves awkwardly because, and I
am deliberately using the professional’s jargon 
‘… the ship has a pair of conjugate poles on the right half
plane’ 
and conjugate poles, a term borrowed from the mathematics
of complex variables, become a part of their reality and ships
really have them (Bissell & Dillon 1993). Gradually the model
becomes a signifier of thoughts about the modelled object that
is signified. Explanations that were once analogous become
real explanations and in this way the analogue provides a
source of new theories, new predictions and new expectations. 
CEREMONIES OF THE PROFESSIONS
Now a model or set of models or genre provide the way in
which specialists, such as engineers, make sense of reality. To
join a profession like engineering involves becoming so famil-
iar with a set of models that the models provide the way in
which someone orders their view of reality. This is not an
overnight task. Spectators will not be able to make any sense
of the use of a profession’s models; their interest will only be
aroused if the models are spectacular and engineering models
are rarely that.
A model is an artefact used by a group of specialists that
inspires a conversation composed of specialised linguistic prac-
tices. From their use of their model, specialists will claim to
make new, reliable predictions or explanations about some
other artefact. While those outside the specialism may be at sea
with the explanations, those inside the specialism identify
themselves by showing satisfaction. Members of the group use
the models because they find the ensuing discussions satisfying.
The use of specialist language, by an identifiable group which
imputes to objects the group’s own special meanings and
whose members engage in activities that give them satisfaction
turns their activity, the use of the model, into a ceremony.
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Ceremonies, as Wittgenstein has said, bring satisfaction (Witt-
genstein 1979a p.4), and the objects that are an essential fea-
ture of the ceremony, the models, are fetishes.
The satisfaction engineers gain comes from the accounts that
are generated by the linguistic practices surrounding the ana-
logues or models that they use. But that satisfaction only
comes once the virtual reality of the analogy becomes their
reality. Achieving that satisfaction is what it means to become
a practitioner. It is as much as anything a matter of faith that
can only be brought about by practice and struggle. It is not to
be found in books or expert systems. An analogy or use of a
model established within a group become a sign of the group’s
identity. The analogies and models a group employs separates
out the group by forming the specialised language that they
use. A model is an object that stimulates, in the identifiable
group, a satisfying discourse about some other object.
People who have not encountered the use of an analogy may
find it mystifying and confusing to use the vocabulary of one
domain in a new context. Newcomers to an established anal-
ogy do not necessarily encounter the analogy in the context
that led to its creation and will not be able to appreciate why it
was needed, but they may invest time in becoming fluent and
confident with the metaphors embedded in the analogy and so
become practitioners themselves.
Some people may treat the analogies and the use of the models
as something that could never make sense to them. The ana-
logue remains for them arbitrary since they are not insinuated
into the tradition. Even so they may still award the analogy a
worthy status or they may place their trust in explanations
exploiting the analogy and therefore recognise any group that
can use the analogy fluently but this recognition is founded in
awe rather than comprehension. The identity of a professional
group is sustained when the use of their models provides a dis-
course that is valued in some way by those outside the group.
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Claims about being able to predict the future and demonstra-
tions of satisfying explanations of the past serve to reinforce the
authority of the profession. The model users become soothsay-
ers, their models become fetishes, their encounters become
ceremonies and their conversations incantations. Models, arte-
facts transformed into fetishes, provide the focus for ceremo-
nies which generate, for the professionals, satisfying accounts
of possible futures, or plausible explanations of the past. The
apprentice’s aim is to share the professional’s obsessions, faith
and satisfaction.





… we shape or reshape our reality as rehearsal propels our 
chosen texts from being mere models towards becoming our 
actuality
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